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government by all those who -so believe; it means merely that
democracy must be regarded by them as subject to the rule of
the sciences of order for man, or, in other words, as an instru-
ment of order rather than its generative source.
Robert A. Pascal*
THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN, by Alpheus
Thomas Mason. Louisiana State University Press, Baton
Rouge, 1958. $4.95.
After some twenty years of relative obscurity vis-a-vis Con-
gress and the President, the Supreme Court is once again in the
public eye. It is the object of mordant denunciation and enthu-
siastic praise, but much that is written by both defenders and
detractors is little more than rampant emotionalism which sheds
little light on the Court's processes or its role in the American
system. Professor Alpheus Mason, one of America's foremost
authorities on the Supreme Court, has produced a splendid little
book which ought to dispel much of the mythology abroad in
the land.
Mr. Mason contends that in order to understand what the
Supreme Court is and what it does, we must first rid ourselves
of the fictitious notion that the Court is a non-political institu-
tion. Mr. Mason's assertion that the Court makes policy is diffi-
cult to gainsay. It has done so ever since the days of John Mar-
shall, and the desegregation decisions, for example, are no differ-
ent in kind than hundreds of other "policy" decisions made by
the Court in the past century and a half. But, asks Professor
Mason, is not an appointive body which is exercising political
control in a supposedly democratic system an "alien offshoot"?
Not at all. The great problem in a democratic polity, says Mason,
is to "protect individuals and minorities without thereby destroy-
ing capacity in the majority to govern." In exercising judicial
review the Court guarantees to minorities access to the political
process, and in so doing, it "implements rather than limits free
government." Since majorities are always in a fluid state,
changing both in composition and in goals, the political rights
of minorities become the "very foundation" of majority rule.
The Supreme Court in a political sense is corrective in nature;
*Professor of Law, LouisianaState University.
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it does not determine in advance what decisions can be made by
political processes. Furthermore, Mr. Mason argues, judicial
activism in the area of political and civil liberties is perfectly
consistent with judicial restraint in economic matters. I would
agree with the author that this is sound constitutional theory.
The Constitution, after all, is silent on the matter of economic
arrangements and espouses no particular economic doctrine; but
it is unequivocal in its restraints in behalf of individual freedom.
If one accepts this view, it follows that the anti-New Deal Court
of the 1930's was frustrating the democratic process, whereas
the Warren Court is properly preserving its integrity.
Once we understand the true function of the Court it is not
enough to study its decisions. We must, suggests Mr. Mason,
study the men who made them. And this the author does with
objectivity, balance, and acumen. Chief Justice Taft is portrayed
as a man who "loathed politics and usually bungled it," but whose
"relish for power was great." He was attracted to the Chief
Justiceship because it bestowed power and dignity without wor-
ry, and under his leadership the judiciary became a "super-legis-
lature." Taft disliked the give and take of free discussion, dis-
trusted dissenters, and even attributed evil motives to those who
differed with him on constitutional issues. His primary goal was
stability - both in society and in judicial decision - but unlike
some of his judicial brethren he recognized the political function
of the Court and did not attempt to gloss it over by invoking
the "mechanical, slot-machine" theory of judicial interpretation.
Although ruthless in using the Fourteenth Amendment to veto
laws interfering with property, Taft, in many instances, led the
Court in sustaining federal regulatory legislation. Mr. Mason
suggests that Taft's Chief Justiceship "might have been con-
structive, but for his haunting fear of progressivism," a fear
which motivated him to wield power in behalf of the dogma of
laissez-faire, a dogma which America had long since rendered
obsolete.
Unlike Taft, Charles Evans Hughes "seemed unduly inter-
ested in preserving the Court's symbolic function" at the expense
of both the form and substance of the law. Hughes, of course,
was Chief Justice during one of the most critical periods in the
Court's history, and his enigmatic constitutional ambivalance
was in part responsible both for the crisis as well as for its
termination. Mason points out that many of Hughes' opinions
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were so filled with subtleties and equivocation that even the most
discerning observers could not penetrate the "judicial smoke-
screen." Students of the Court confused his dissenting opinions
with his concurrences to the point that some writers depicted
Hughes as being perfectly consistent throughout his judicial ca-
reer. According to Mason, however, Hughes (and Roberts) "beat
a retreat" in order to sanction a constitutional transformation
which, in terms of speed and execution was "unprecedented in
the annals of the Supreme Court." Hughes can be better char-
acterized, therefore, as a master political strategist and it was
in this role that he closely resembled Marshall.
Harlan Fiske Stone was appointed to the Supreme Court in
1925, serving under both Taft and Hughes before President
Roosevelt elevated him to the Chief Justiceship. During the judi-
cial regimes of both Taft and Hughes, Stone differed from his
colleagues on the Right who wrote their economic predilections
into constitutional law. As Chief Justice he was at odds with
his brethren on the Left who furthered political preference
through judicial opinion. Stone was, in Mason's view, a moder-
ate, a conscientious practitioner of judicial self-restraint. Ad-
mitting that a judge's personal preference inevitably enters the
law, Stone urged restraint to tame subjectivity, not to eliminate
it. Stone was the man who, in both the old and the new Court,
carried the precepts of Holmes and Brandeis to fulfillment.
"Though an habitual Republican, Stone knew that increased use
of government power is a necessary concomitant of twentieth
century conditions." Although Stone's Court was one of the most
openly quarrelsome in history, the author rates Stone above
Hughes and Taft; in fact describes him as "one of the great
creative judges of our time." Unanimity on the Court is not
necessarily a wise criterion for judging the effectiveness of the
Chief Justice or for evaluating the work of the Court. Mr. Ma-
son reminds us that the Court through its learned debates on
the great constitutional questions renders an inestimable serv-
ice in educating the public. I believe that this educational func-
tion of the Supreme Court, often overlooked by the Court's crit-
ics, deserves the emphasis which the author gives to it. Dissent-
ing opinions are not merely constitutional chaff, and a divided
court is not the enemy of stability. Constitutional growth is,
after all, the result of disagreement, and this is as it should be
in any free society.
In addition to the penetrating vignettes of Taft, Hughes, and
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Stone the book is sprinkled throughout with keen analyses of the
personal and judicial philosophies of other Justices past and
present. This is responsible, able, and thorough scholarship at
its best. What's more, it is lively and engrossing reading for
lawyer and layman alike.
Robert J. Steamer*
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